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NOTES AND COMMENTS
fraud rather than the prevention of it. The main purpose rule has an
important place in the North Carolina law of contract. It would indeed
be a surprise to the hundreds of merchants who extend credit to tenant
farmers on the landlord's promise to stand for the debt to learn that the
landlord was not responsible unless there was a writing evidencing his
promise. But if we are to retain the doctrine, it is submitted that there
should be an attempt to harmonize the decisions so as to prevent such
incompatible rulings as those presented by the two recent cases noted.
FRANKLIN T. DuPpEE, JR.
United States-Suits against the Government-
Cancellation of Air Mail Contracts.
In February, 1934, Postmaster General Farley cancelled government
mail contracts of three air transportation companies; and, under au-
thority from President Roosevelt, turned over the task of carrying the
air mail which the companies had been performing, to army planes
and pilots. One of these companies brought suit against Farley to
force the restoration by him of its cancelled contract. Held, bill dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction in a suit substantially one against the
United States.'
There are, in this and similar cases, three possible lines of procedure: (1)
The injured party may sue the official in a strictly personal action for
damages. This redress is open only in cases where the officer has com-
mitted a tort.2 Such as act must have been done without authority;
but apparent authority will not protect a defendant.3 (2) If Congress
has given its consent, the plaintiff may sue the United States.4 This has
generally been allowed only in cases on contract brought in the Court
of Claims.5 (3) Finally, as in the principal case, the aggrieved may
sue the officer in a quasi-private capacity and ask that the particular act
be restrained, or, in case of non-action, compelled.
In cases of this last type, granted that the official acted either (1)
without auliority, or (2) illegally, or (3) in an attempt to enforce an
sunp (3rd ed. 1905) §81; 1 Wn.LIsToN, CONTRACTS (1920 ed.) §470; Arnold, The
Main Purpose Rule and The Statute of Frauds (1924) 10 CoRN L. Q. 28; Fal-
conbridge, Guarantees and the Statute of Frauds (1919) 68 U. PA. L. R~v. 1.
I Transcontinental and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Farley, 71 F. (2d) 288
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; certiorari denied U. S. Supreme Court, Oct. 14, 1934.
Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U. S. 137, 9 L. ed. 373 (1835).
Little v. Barreme, 6 U. S. 170, 2 L. ed. 243 (1804).
'U. S. ex rel. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U. S. 470, 9 Sup. Ct. 382, 32 L. ed. 785
(1888) ; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 3734 22 Sup. Ct. 650, 46 L. ed. 945
(1902) (Consent had been given).
'The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is defined in 28 U. S. C. A. §250
(1928). It is said that the next move of the airlines will be to sue in this court.
U. S. News Weekly, Oct. 22, 1934, p. 14.
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unconstitutional statute, and that the injury is one properly cognizable
by the courts; still, if the suit is regarded as against the United States,
the court wil have no jurisdiction and a resort to it will bring no
redress. 6
The rule that no state7 can be sued without its consent is considered
axiomatic in the law,8 and is no longer limited to cases wherein the state
appears on the record as a party.9 The doctrine is based on two quite
separate considerations: (1) That the state is sovereign. It can do no
wrong, and the court is powerless to enforce decrees against it.10 (2)
That the courts will not interfere with the processes of government by
controlling discretionary acts of officials, or, as it is sometimes phrased,
that the courts will not decide a political question. 11 It is necessary,
therefore, when the objection is raised that a suit is one against the
state, to determine whether it is either directed against the sovereign as
such, or is one which involves interference with executive discretion.
Is the sovereign state sued? If it is the nominal party defendant,
obviously so.12 If not, then the question becomes whether or not it has
such an interest in the outcome that the suit is in reality one against it.
A direct property right in the subject of the controversy is such an
'Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 26 Sup. Ct. 568, 50 L. ed. 955 (1906).
"A distinction is sometimes taken between suits against a state as an ideal
person and those against the government which is its agent. The differentiation,
though valid as a recognition of the two reasons for the rule, is a confusing one
and is not adhered to in the present note. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270,
5 Sup. Ct. 903, 29 L. ed. 185 (1884).
8Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. 264, 380, 5 L. ed. 257 (1821) (The doctrine was,
without comment, recognized for the first time in the United States Supreme
Court). Amend. XI to the U. S. CoNsT. makes the situation identical in suits
brought against officers of the states of the Union with those against officers of
the United States.
"Ex pare Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct 164, 31 L. ed. 216 (1887) ; United
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882). The rule laid
down by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 22
U. S. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (1824) that jurisdiction in these cases is to be determined
by inspection of the record has been "modified" by subsequent decisions, supra,
until it now means only that lack of jurisdiction may be determined by inspection.
1 BL. Comm. *242 Blackstone cites as authority for this proposition BRAc-
TON, DE LcrBus Er CoNsu nr mD Bus Aw mLn, f. 5b (1285) in which Bracton
says, "The king himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and
to the law, for the law makes the king. Let the king attribute (attribuat rex) to
the law ... dominion and power." However, the same author says, op. cit. supra
f. 34, "The king has a superior, to-wit God. Likewise the law by which the king
is made. Likewise his court, to-wit counts and barons, because they are called
counts as if equals of the king, and he who has an equal has a master." This
latter passage is marked as being of doubtful authority in the edition of Bracton
published by the Yale Press (1922).
nMississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 18 L. ed. 437 (1866) (The case raises
an additional question of the power of the court in any event to control the
Executive Department which is the President of the United States, but was
decided on both grounds. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U. S. 50, 18 L. ed. 721 (1867).
" See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882).
The writer has been unable to find any considered case, not in the Court of Claims,
in which the United States was expressly made a party defendant.
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interest ;13 but the fact that the government owns all of the stock in a
defendant corporation has been held not to defeat an action.1 4 Also, if
the effect of a decree in the case will be to enforce specific performance
against the state, the suit cannot be maintained.1 5 The principal case
was decided on this basis.
Is the case such that the court, if it took jurisdiction, would be
forced to control executive discretion? If the officer acted without his
authority, he had no discretion whatever and an injunction will issue ;16
and since an unconstitutional statute gives no authority, an attempt to
enforce such a law will be restrained.17 But, if the official acted within
his authority, the court will ordinarily not move to restrain him and
will not consider the juestion of the illegality of the act.1 8 Further-
more, because of the policy against supervision of executive administra-
tion, the court will not enforce affirmative action on his part, even though
non-action amounts to a violation of the Constitution.1 9 If, however,
there is a refusal to do an act which is purely ministerial, that is, one
concerning which the officer has no discretion, the court will issue a
mandamus compelling performance 2 0
'Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 40 L. ed. 599 (1895) (Suit
to enjoin the use of United States property in the hands of defendant on the
grounds that plaintiff's patent rights had been violated. Dismissed.) ; Oregon v.
Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 26 Sup. Ct. 568, 50 L. ed. 955 (1906) (The United States
had title to land claimed by plaintiff.) ; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331,
27 Sup. Ct. 388, 51 L. ed. 510 (1906) (Case against the Secretary of the Interior
dismissed because the effect of a decree favorable to plaintiff would be to oust sub-
sequent grantees of the United States and give them claims against the state.) ;
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882) (The
court first held that title to the land in question was not in the United States and
then enjoined officers, who claimed to hold for the government, from occupying
the premises). In these cases the ostrich-like procedure of determining jurisdic-
tion by first deciding whether title actually is in the state is followed. However,
a desirable result is attained at only a small sacrifice of logic.
"Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S. 594, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. ed. 762 (1922).
'1 Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 38 Sup. Ct. 317, 62 L. ed. 755 (1917) ; United
States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218, 34 Sup. Ct. 84, 58 L. ed. 191
(1913).
" Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U. S. 135, 39
Sup. Ct. 502 63 L. ed. 897 (1918). (Though holding that the defendant acted
within his authority, the court considered the merits saying that the claim of a
lack of authority was not so frivolous as to form no basis for jurisdiction);
American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33, 47 L. ed. 90 (1902).
" Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed. 819 (1897) ; Pen-
noyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 699, 35 L. ed. 363 (1890).
"Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 34 Sup. Ct 938, 58 L. ed. 1506 (1913)
(Interpretation of the tariff act in question was within the discretion of the de-
fendant, Secretary of the Treasury) ; Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164,
31 L. ed. 216 (1887) ; Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409, 51 Sup. Ct. 186, 75 L. ed.
388 (1930) (An allegation that taxes collected were illegal made suit against tax
collector personal).
"Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 6 Sup. Ct. 608, 29 L. ed. 805 (1885) ; see
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, at 16, cited note 17, mtpra.
'*Houston v. Ormes, 252 U. S. 469, 40, Sup. Ct. 369, 64 L. ed. 667 (1919) ; Gar-
field v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249, 29 Sup. Ct. 62, 53 L. ed. 168 (1908).
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These rules are laid down as being separate and distinct, but it must
be observed that in practice both principles are frequently involved in
the same case and often, as in the leading case of United States v. Lee,21
the determination of whether or not the state has an interest in the out-
come of the suit will incidentally also determine the question of the offi-
cer's authority. Thus, in the principal case, not only -has the United
States an interest in the suit, but also a decree forcing Farley to reinstate
the contract would involve the difficulties attendant upon the super-
vision of an official's performance of his duties.
Were the rules governing these cases otherwise, there would be
opened an opportunity for an interference with governmental func-
tions which would put the good of a private individual above the gen-
eral welfare. Just when this is not true is a question of policy best
determined, as it has been, by Congress which has, in general, provided
adequate relief in case where the injury is the result of a breach of
contract. PETER W. HAiRSTONS.
Wills-Posthumous Continuation of Undue Influence.
In a will contest, caveators offered evidence of undue influence al-
leged to have been exerted by testator's wife, and proponents objected
on the ground that the contested codicils were executed eight days and
ninety-eight days respectively after her death. Held, in contemplation
of law, undue influence does not necessarily cease with the death of the
person alleged to have exercised it. Judgment for caveators sustained.'
It is well established that influence alleged to be undue need not be
physical force but may be, and, in fact, more often is some more subtle
power which operates only on the mind of the testator.2 No overt acts
of any kind need be exercised at the exact time of the execution of the
will,8 nor is there any fixed time limit as to the admissibility of acts
committed previously.4 Questions of remoteness are largely within
1 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882).
1 Trusf Co. v. Ivey, 178 Ga. 629, 173 S. E. 648 (1934).
Only one American and one English case have been found in point, and both
are in accord with the principal case. Penniston v. Kerrigan, 159 Ga. 345, 125
S. E. 795 (1924) (death preceded testamentary act by approximately eight
months); Radford v. Risdon, 28 T. L. R. 342, 55 Sol. Jo. 416 (Pros. Div., and
Adm. Divq 1912) (death preceded testamentary act by eleven days).
211 re Hinton's Will, 180 N. C. 206, 104 S. E. 341 (1920); Marx v. McGlynn,
88 N. Y. 357 (1882) ; In re Brunor's Will, 43 N. Y. S. 1141, 19 Misc. Rep. 203
(1896); RooD, WnLs (2d ed. 1926) §§175, 176; 1 ScHOULER, WILLS, ExECUTORS
AND ADMrNISTRATORS (5th ed. 1915) §§228, 229.
1 Shepardson v. Potter, 53 Mich. 106, 18 N. W. 575 (1884) ; Mowry v. Nor-
man, 204 Mo. 173, 103 S. W. 15 (1907); Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66, 246 S. W.
218 (1922) ; Kaechelen v. Barringer, 19 S. W. (2d) 1033 (Mo. App. 1929) ; 1 PAGE,
Wx.ms (2d ed. 1926) §194.
'Huffman v. Groves, 245 IIl. 440, 92 N. E. 289 (1910).
